The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is widely used as an authentication framework to control the access to wireless networks, e.g. in IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.16 networks. In this paper, we discuss limitations of EAP security and demonstrate how these limitations can be exploited to launch attacks on existing EAP methods. In particular, we present a series of attacks which cause some standard security claims, namely channel binding, protected ciphersuite negotiation and cryptobinding, to fail and compromise the key exchange, authentication and privacy of EAP communications. Next, we identify the special security challenges of EAP systems that may cause the considered security claims to fail. EAP differs from other authentication frameworks as a two party protocol, like IKE and TLS, because it is conducted with three parties involved across two communication links with different media. Another security challenge of EAP is the negotiability of EAP methods, ciphersuites, and protocol versions. These challenges make it difficult to derive a trust model for EAP and to securely adopt existing protocols. Finally, we conclude with recommendations for more secure EAP implementations. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. not provide any physical protection. Without implementing any layer of security, adversaries can eavesdrop on wireless communications and unauthorized users can easily access the network. To prevent these and other attacks, wireless networks need to provide an access control mechanism that enables authentication of all wireless users who wish to access the network. The authentication needs to be mutual to prevent an adversary from masquerading as a wireless access point. Furthermore, a key management scheme is needed to establish keys that can be used to secure all communications over the wireless channel.
not provide any physical protection. Without implementing any layer of security, adversaries can eavesdrop on wireless communications and unauthorized users can easily access the network. To prevent these and other attacks, wireless networks need to provide an access control mechanism that enables authentication of all wireless users who wish to access the network. The authentication needs to be mutual to prevent an adversary from masquerading as a wireless access point. Furthermore, a key management scheme is needed to establish keys that can be used to secure all communications over the wireless channel.
Currently, the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in IETF RFC 3748 [13] , has been adopted by a few wireless standards as an access authentication and key establishment protocol. For example, IEEE 802.11i [6] makes use of IEEE 802.1X [8] , which relies on EAP for authentication. EAP is also an authentication option in IEEE 802.16e [9] . EAP is an authentication framework that defines message formats and flows to support different authentication methods, referred to as EAP methods in the remainder of this paper. There are currently more than 40 EAP methods, e.g. EAP-TLS [16] , EAP-TTLS [4] , and EAP-GPSK [3] . EAP was originally designed for the use with the Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP). However, today EAP is widely used to control access to wireless networks and we limit our discussion to wireless usage in the remainder of this paper.
The security of EAP methods is currently evaluated by checking whether a method meets the security claims defined in Section 7.2 in RFC 3748. The security claims consist of a mixture of security objectives (e.g. mutual authentication), potential attacks (e.g. dictionary attacks) and protocol features (e.g. fast reconnect). Security requirements for 802.11i WLANs are described in [14] and the same requirements have been adopted for 802.16e networks. A more general threat model for EAP methods is introduced in an Internet draft [1] . Despite all these efforts to provide some means to analyze the security of EAP methods, a clear trust model and definitions of security objectives are still missing. Hence, the security of EAP methods has not been analyzed in a rigorous fashion.
In this paper we demonstrate how the special properties of EAP can be exploited by an adversary and we present a series of attacks which break security claims of selected EAP methods. The considered security claims defined in RFC 3748 are used as a check list in the security considerations in all proposed EAP methods. In particular, we present attacks on channel binding, protected ciphersuite negotiation and cryptobinding which compromise the authen- We then identify the special challenges of EAP systems that enable these attacks and cause certain security claims to fail. We conclude this paper by giving recommendations for EAP implementations that prevent the presented and other attacks.
In Section 2, we review the EAP communication model and security claims. In Section 3, we present a series of attacks on selected security claims that compromise security objectives of EAP methods. In Section 4, we analyze the special challenges of EAP and discuss the resulting limitations of EAP security. Finally, we give conclusions and recommendations in the last section.
REVIEW EAP

EAP Communication Model
EAP is a two party protocol between a wireless terminal device, called a peer, and an authenticator. A successful authentication will authorize the peer to access the network. In most of the cases, the authenticator employs a backend authentication server (AS) to store and use long-term credentials for authentication and key establishment. As a result, the EAP communication model typically consists of three parties, namely, a peer, an authenticator and the AS. In this paper, we assume that peer and AS communicate via an authenticator in pass-through mode, i.e. the authenticator passes the messages from peer to AS and vice versa.
The communication link between peer and authenticator is typically wireless, e.g. IEEE 802.11 [5] or IEEE 802.16 [7] , and we denote the link CL1. Authenticator and AS communicate over a wired link which we call CL2 using an AAA protocol, e.g. RADIUS [11] or DIAMETER [12] . Here we will assume the AS will function as an AAA server without distinguishing them physically. The EAP communication model with different links and layers is depicted in Figure 1 . Notice that an authenticator operating as a pass-through device does not need to implement any EAP methods and thus has no EAP method layer as indicated in Figure 1 .
Generally, an EAP execution consists of messages as EAPRequest (AS to peer) and EAP-Response (peer to AS) pairs plus a success and failure message (AS to peer). The first request/response pair serves to exchange the peer's identity and to negotiate an EAP method. Subsequently, most EAP methods exchange two to three request/response pairs to complete procedures like ciphersuite negotiation, authentication, and key exchange. Typically the ciphersuite negotiation negotiates authentication and key exchange algorithms. For a selected authentication algorithm, certain long-term credentials, such as public/private keys or pre-shared secret keys, must be used in cryptographic operations. In addition, an encryption algorithm and a message integrity code (MIC) may be negotiated to protect the remaining EAP exchanges once the keys are available. The negotiated algorithms will be used in all subsequent EAP messages to provide entity authentication, key exchange, confidentiality, integrity, and may be other desirable security properties. Notice that the selected ciphersuite is only used to protect messages during the EAP communication. For lower layer communications another ciphersuite will be negotiated upon the EAP communication is completed, which is out of the scope of EAP ciphersuite negotiations.
EAP Security Claims
We list the security claims from Section 7.2 in RFC 3748 in Table 1 . Claims 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7 are security properties that can be evaluated in a security analysis of an EAP method. Claims 4 and 8 describe the resistance to particular attacks and are in fact redundant if the mutual authentication (Claim 2) is secure. Claim 6 describes the capability of an EAP method to derive exportable keys yet does not specify secure key establishment as a requirement. Claims 9 and 12 are features not directly security-related but all other security properties should still hold if these features are provided. Please note that none of the three proposed EAP methods in RFC 3748 meets all security claims. Some commonly employed EAP methods that were defined after the publication of RFC 3748, such as EAP-TLS and EAP-TTLS, claim to provide most or all of the security claims in Table 1 . However, we will show in a case study in Section 3 that even if an EAP method provides all security claims, we can launch attacks such that some of the claims fail. Failing claims may cause authentication, key exchange and other security features to fail as well. In particular, we will focus on the following security claims which we briefly describe in the following: protected ciphersuite negotiation (Claim 1), cryptographic binding (Claim 10) and channel binding (Claim 13). Please refer to [13] for a description of the other claims.
Protected ciphersuite negotiation is necessary to ensure that the ciphersuites, that have been selected to protect the EAP communications, are negotiated in a secure fashion. As mentioned earlier, a ciphersuite CS typically consists of authentication, key exchange, encryption algorithms, and a MIC, which we denote as CS= {AUTH, KE, ENC, MIC}. The number and kind of negotiated algorithms vary for different EAP methods. In a common negotiation, one party (peer or AS) offers a choice of ciphersuites, with CS of f er = {CS 1 , . . . , CS n }, and the other party (AS or peer) chooses a ciphersuite CSi out of this selection, with CS sel =CSi and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In another variant, one party offers one ciphersuite and the other party accepts or rejects by sending an ACK or NAK, respectively. This so-called bidding is repeated until an ACK is received. Offered and selected ciphersuites must be implemented by the respective entities and be in compliance with the entity's security policy. Ideally, both parties agree on the most secure ciphersuite that meets these requirements.
To ensure a protected ciphersuite negotiation, so-called downgrading attacks need to be prevented in which adversaries force peer and AS to select a weak ciphersuite when in fact both parties can and are willing to support stronger ciphersuites. For instance, an adversary could modify CS of f er to only contain weak ciphersuites or can repeatedly send NAKs in the bidding variant until the weakest ciphersuite is offered. To detect these kinds of downgrading attacks, the messages containing the offered and selected ciphersuites (or offered ciphersuites and ACK/NAK) must be integrity protected, such that peer and AS can verify whether CS of f er and CS sel have been modified. Hence, protected ciphersuite negotiation requires an integrity check of the messages that have exchanged during the negotiation. This is typically achieved by computing MICs over the exchanged messages once fresh keys have been established.
Channel binding has been a vague concept. After exploring all IETF RFCs and drafts which handled channel binding, it is understood as a procedure that enables peer and AS to compare and verify information, such as identifiers, provided by the authenticator to both parties during an EAP session. Hence, the purpose of channel binding is to prevent rogue authenticators from launching impersonation attacks. In order to provide a consistency check that compares the received information on the peer and AS side, peer and AS must share an integrity protected and authentic channel. This can be done once the two of them have established a key by way of the EAP execution. In addition, at least one party must be able to verify that the information, provided by the authenticator, is correct. Because the peer and authenticator do not share any credentials, a priori, this check needs to be performed by the AS. Once it has performed this verification, the AS needs to securely inform the peer of the verification result (true or false).
Cryptographic binding has been introduced to prevent Manin-the-Middle (MitM) attacks on tunnelled EAP methods. In tunnelled EAP methods an outer protocol is executed to establish a secure tunnel between peer and AS. The outer protocol comprises ciphersuite negotiation, outer authentication and outer key exchange. The outer authentication is typically unilateral, namely server to peer, but may be mutual in some cases. The tunnel is typically established using a server public key certificate for server authentication and a public key scheme, such as Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange or RSA, to establish a tunnel key K T . Upon completion of the outer protocol, the inner authentication and key exchange algorithms are executed within the tunnel, i.e. protected under the tunnel key K T . Tunnelled EAP methods are intended to enable the secure usage of legacy authentication schemes for client authentication within the tunnel. For example, a tunnelled method may be used to protect password-based peer authentication from dictionary attacks. However, MitM attacks on tunnelled EAP methods have been presented in [2] . In a MitM attack, the adversary passively observes the execution of an untunnelled legacy authentication protocol by a peer. Then the adversary starts a tunnelled EAP session with the AS that provides only unilateral authentication (server to adversary). The adversary derives tunnel key K T . Then he plays the responses from the recorded legacy protocol back into the tunnel and thus successfully authenticates himself as the peer to the AS. Since the EAP keying material is only derived from the outer protocol, i.e. K T , the adversary is able to compute the EAP Security Claims [13] 1.
Protected ciphersuite negotiation 2.
Mutual authentication 3.
Integrity protection 4.
Replay protection 5. Confidentiality 6.
Key derivation 7.
Key strength 8.
Dictionary attack resistance 9.
Fast reconnect 10. Cryptographic binding 11. Session independence 12. Fragmentation 13. Channel binding The MitM attacks work because there is no way to check wether an EAP is executed within a tunnel or not and the EAP keying material is solely derived from the outer key exchange algorithm. To mitigate the described MitM attacks, RFC 3748 defines the property of cryptographic binding as demonstration that a single entity has acted as the peer during protocol execution. A method of how to achieve this property is introduced in [2] , where it is suggested to cryptographically bind the tunnel key KT and the keying material derived from the inner key exchange K I in order to derive the EAP keying material. Since the MitM does not possess K I , he cannot compute the EAP keys and the attack fails. In the remainder of the paper we refer to cryptographic binding as the binding of tunnel and inner keying material, i.e. we use the definition in [2] rather than the one in RFC 3748.
CASE STUDY: WHERE SECURITY CLAIMS FAIL AND COMPROMISE EAP SECU-RITY
In this section we present attacks that exploit special properties of EAP systems to break EAP security claims. In particular, the attacks break the channel binding, protected ciphersuite negotiation and cryptographic bindings of EAP methods that claim to provide such security properties. As a consequence the authentication, key exchange and/or privacy of the EAP communication are compromised. Some attacks work for general EAP methods, whereas others are described for particular EAP methods.
Breaking Protected Ciphersuite Negotiations
We now present how a downgrading attack can be successfully executed without being detected by peer and AS, even if an EAP method claims protected ciphersuite negotiation, e.g. EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, EAP-GPSK. The considered negotiations are integrity protected by a MIC key IK that is derived from keying material established between peer and AS during the EAP execution. In a successful downgrading attack, an adversary first forces peer and AS to agree on a weak ciphersuite CSw and then breaks the selected key exchange and/or authentication algorithms without being detected. Such an attack is depicted in Figure 2 , in which CS w Figure 2 : Downgrading Attack on Protected Ciphersuite Negotiation denotes a weak ciphersuite containing a weak key exchange algorithm KE w and optionally a weak authentication algorithm AU T H w . Here, "weak key exchange algorithm" refers to a key exchange algorithm that is breakable on-line, i.e. in realtime, whereas weak authentication scheme refers to an authentication algorithm that is breakable off-line. In the presentation of the attack and Figure 2 we omit the exchange of identities and success/failure messages and solely focus on request and response pairs used for ciphersuite negotiation, authentication and key exchange. We refer to these messages as handshake messages HSX, where X is the negotiated EAP method. Furthermore, we denote a MIC over a message m using a MIC key IK as input as [m]IK . To launch a successful downgrading attack on EAP methods claiming protected ciphersuite negotiation, a weak key exchange algorithm must be part of the offered ciphersuites CS of f er . During an attack, an adversary modifies the first handshake message HSX-1 by reducing CS of f er = {CS1, . . . , CSw, . . . , CSn} to only weak ciphersuites, i.e. HSX-1 = CS of f er = {CS w }. However, to prevent these malicious modifications from being detected, the adversary needs to compute IK after observing the second handshake message HSX-2 and then modify messages HSX-3 and HSX-4, respectively, by changing the MIC to contain the modified offer CS of f er = {CS w } and the initial offer CS of f er , respectively. If the adversary is capable of breaking the key exchange on-line, the downgrading attack will remain undetected and the adversary is able to obtain the keying material derived in this session. Furthermore, the adversary can break the authentication scheme off-line and use the obtained long-term authentication credentials in other EAP sessions to impersonate the peer.
Breaking Privacy
We now analyze tunnelled EAP methods that first establish an outer tunnel to protect subsequent communications, e.g. EAP-TTLS. The intention of tunnelled EAP is to allow a peer to authenticate itself within the secure tunnel by using one of the widely deployed, yet cryptographically weak, legacy authentication methods that do not require client certificates, such as low entropy password schemes. Another usage of tunnelled EAP methods is to provide privacy of peer and AS by using anonymous key exchange algorithms to establish the outer tunnel. For example, EAP-TTLS provides privacy to the peer and AS by using anonymous DiffieHellman (DH) key exchange to establish the outer tunnel. In that case there will be no outer authentication and the identities of peer and AS will not be revealed during the establishment of the tunnel. However, an adversary can launch a MitM attack and establish Tunnel 1 with the peer and Tunnel 2 with the AS, as illustrated in Figure 3 . Once both tunnels have been established upon the completion of the outer key exchange, the adversary can eavesdrop on all communications within the tunnel, i.e. the execution of the inner authentication and inner key exchange. To do this, the adversary needs to decrypt the peer's messages from Tunnel 1 and re-encrypt them with the key for Tunnel 2, and vice versa for messages sent from AS to peer. Now, the adversary can eavesdrop on the identifiers that are exchanged as part of the inner protocol, and thus, the privacy of peer and AS is compromised. Please recall that anonymous key exchange is typically used to provide privacy. However, we just demonstrated that, in the presence of an active adversary, anonymous tunnels cannot provide privacy. We will demonstrate, in the next subsection, that anonymous key exchange algorithms may make EAP methods vulnerable to even more severe attacks.
Breaking Cryptographic Bindings
As discussed earlier, tunnelled EAP methods must provide cryptographic bindings to prevent MitM attacks [2] . We now demonstrate that, despite cryptographic bindings, an adversary can launch a MitM attack, if the key exchange algorithm that is used to establish the outer tunnel is anonymous, and the inner key exchange algorithm is weak. For example, the presented attack works on EAP-TTLS employing the anonymous DH-key exchange supported by TLS v1.1 as outer key exchange and a weak inner key exchange algorithm.
In a successful attack, the adversary first launches a MitM attack on the outer anonymous key exchange, as described in Section 3.2 and illustrated in Figure 3 . After a successful MitM attack, the adversary shares a tunnel key K T 1 with the peer and another tunnel key K T 2 with the AS, while peer and AS believe they established a common tunnel key KT 1 and KT 2 , respectively, with each other. Now the adversary has access to the unprotected inner authentication and key exchange executed within the tunnel(s). Upon the completion of the inner key exchange, peer and AS both share a common key KI , which is used in combination with the tunnel key to compute a cryptographically bound key IK. Here, the peer computes IK p as function of K I and its tunnel key K T 1 , ie. IK p = f (K T 1 , K I ) with f () being a secure key derivation function, whereas the AS computes IKAS = f (KT 2 , KI ). Peer and AS will detect the MitM attack if they notice that IKp = IKAS. For that reason the adversary needs to break the inner key exchange on-line, derive K I , and then modify all messages protected by IK p and IK AS , respectively, as previously described for downgrading attacks in Section 3.1.
The adversary may break the inner authentication algorithm off-line and use the obtained long-term credentials in other EAP sessions to impersonate the peer. Please note that an off-line analysis of recorded messages may include but is not limited to brute-force, dictionary or cipher textonly attacks aimed at obtaining the long-term credentials or other secrets. In order to resist on-line attacks, selecting security parameters such that 2 40 real-time computations are necessary to break the system may be sufficient, whereas preventing off-line attacks requires security parameters such that 2 60 to 2 80 off-line computations are necessary to break the system [10] .
We would like to point out that the described attack is practical even though it is only successful if: 1) the tunnel is established using anonymous key exchange, 2) the inner key exchange can be broken on-line, and optionally, 3) the inner authentication algorithm can be broken off-line. First, the attack is practical because anonymous key exchange algorithms are still supported, e.g. in TLS v1.1 used in EAP-TTLS or used for instance to provide privacy. Furthermore, an adversary could force the parties to use anonymous key exchange as a result of a successful downgrading attack. Second, the inner methods in tunnelled EAP methods are usually weak, because the original intention of tunnelled EAP methods was to enable peers to use weak algorithms in a secure tunnel. In addition, if static components are used in the inner key exchange and/or authentication, the adversary might not need to break the key exchange algorithm on-line. Upon noticing that IK AS = IK p , peer and AS are likely to re-initiate the inner authentication or key exchange or the entire EAP session which gives the adversary more time to break the inner key exchange. Please recall that under normal circumstances it is assumed that no third party has access to the algorithms executed within the tunnel. We would like to mention that the authors in [2] already pointed out that cryptographic binding is only secure in combination with strong outer authentication (at least server authentication). We demonstrated that commonly used EAP methods claim the property of cryptographic binding without ensuring that all necessary conditions to prevent MitM attacks are met. Hence, the presented MitM attacks are still feasible when tunnelled EAP methods, including EAP-TTLS, that claim cryptographic bindings are used.
Breaking Channel Bindings
Informally, channel binding is a service to assure a peer that an authenticator is eligible. In other words, it provides post EAP security for subsequent lower layer communications between the peer and the authenticator. Therefore, channel binding depends on the following three conditions:
1. There is an authenticated channel between a peer and AS;
2. Each authenticator is authenticated to the AS with a unique identifier/address; 3. The AS has the capability to map that unique identifier/address to the authenticator's lower layer identitifier/adress.
Currently, for all existing EAP methods, channel binding is claimed if Condition 1 is satisfied. However, there is no way to check Condition 2, i.e. whether AS can detect a rogue authenticator through authentication, since it is out of the scope of EAP assumptions. Usually this part of the communication is handled in the AAA protocol. Furthermore, if the AS has no capability to map the authenticator identifier that has been provided to the AS to a lower layer identifier that was presented to the peer, Condition 3 is not satisfied. In that case the authenticated tunnel cannot provide any assurance to the peer. Since Conditions 2 and 3 cannot be satisfied solely by any EAP method, channel binding should never be claimed.
EAP SECURITY CHALLENGES
In this section we discuss why deriving a trust model for EAP and analyzing the security of EAP methods are such difficult tasks, compared to other protocols like IKE/IPsec and TLS. The challenges posed by EAP systems give rise to vulnerabilities of the discussed security claims and other security properties. In the previous section we have demonstrated how these vulnerabilities can be exploited to launch attacks on EAP methods and now we discuss what causes these problems. We group the challenges posed by EAP systems into four primary problems:
1. Some EAP security claims depend on assumptions about other protocols, like AAA; 2. Authenticators are at higher risk of compromise than NASs in AAA;
3. EAP is executed over different layers and across different media links;
4. Backward compatibility and advanced security features leave holes for attacks.
For the links between authenticators and AS, EAP employs AAA protocols to communicate. As a result, it implicitly assumes that the authenticator behaves as a network access server (NAS) in AAA protocol. Furthermore, it implies that NAS and AAA server have a trust relationship, which may be established beforehand. For a given EAP method, this is assumed but cannot be verified.
However, even if an authenticator and AS have established a trust relationship a priori, the EAP methods are executed in an insecure environment: Authenticators are typically inexpensive devices that are distributed at publicly accessible locations to enable network access to wireless peers. Hence, authenticators are easy to steal or tamper with and we must generally assume that authenticators are at high risk of compromise. This potential vulnerability requires that a trust model be used to analyze an EAP method, that takes compromised authenticators into account. Please note that the trust model in RFC 3748 considers adversaries masquerading as authenticator but not compromised authenticators, whereas the trust model in [1] considers compromised and stolen authenticators.
The third problem is based on the different communication media used by the EAP parties (see Figure 1 ). Communications at different layers result in the use of different identifiers and addresses. For instance, authenticator and AS communicate at a higher layer in the protocol stack, e.g. at the IP layer using NAS-ID as identifiers and IP addresses. On the other hand, peer and authenticator communicate at a protocol layer below the IP layer and the authenticator may use BSSID as identifier and MAC address. As a consequence, a consistency check of identifiers and addresses, as required for channel binding, is not straightforward. While establishing an integrity protected channel is fairly simple to achieve during an EAP communication, comparing different types of addresses, such as IP and MAC addresses, and different identifiers, such as NAS-ID and BSSID, is difficult. Basically, peer and AS need to be able to decide whether two types of addresses/identifiers belong to the same device. If AS and peer implement the same lower layer, they received the same lower layer address/identifier from the authenticator. In that case, both parties could exchange the received information as opaque data during the EAP communication and compare the data at the lower (common) layer. The result of this consistency check (true or false) is then exported to the EAP layer. However, as discussed earlier, peer and AS typically do not implement the same lower layers and thus cannot perform a direct comparison. To address this problem, at least one party needs to be able to map the two types of addresses/identifiers to a common comparable address/identifier. The necessary mapping requires some infrastructure, and thus we believe that only the AS may be able to perform this mapping. In this solution, peer and AS securely exchange the received information. Then the AS maps the provided address/identifier to an address/identifier it can verify, such as Called-Station-ID, Calling-Station-ID, NAS-Identifier, NAS-IP-Address or NAS-IPv6-Address. In order to perform a secure mapping the AS needs to access either a secure database containing entries of such address mappings or a trusted third party that can perform the mapping and return a secured result (true or false) or a certificate of the mapping. It should be fairly obvious that the implementation of such a mapping is quite complex. Challenges 1-3 make channel binding hard if not infeasible. Other difficulties especially for the security analysis of EAP methods arise from these challenges.
The fourth problem that makes implementing security in EAP systems a challenging task is the property that EAP methods, protocol versions and cryptographic ciphersuites are negotiable. From a security point of view, any downgrading attack could be prevented altogether, if the implementation of any weak EAP method, version, and crypto algorithm were prohibited. If all offered choices in a negotiation were secure, an adversary who successfully launched a downgrading attack would still not succeed in breaking the system. However, the prohibition of all weak EAP methods, protocol versions, and ciphersuites is not practical, because the negotiations serve to accommodate flexibility for vendor implementations, backward compatibility with older protocol versions or algorithms, export restrictions, e.g. on cryptographic key sizes and other government-imposed restrictions. In some cases weak algorithms are offered to provide special security properties such as privacy. For these reasons many EAP implementations still support weak ciphersuites, e.g. key exchange or encryption algorithms with keys that are too short to withstand brute force attacks, weak authentication schemes that are vulnerable to dictionary attacks, and anonymous key exchange algorithms that are vulnerable to MitM attacks.
In order to detect a downgrading attack, peer and AS need to verify the integrity of the ciphersuite negotiations. During an integrity check, peer and AS make sure that the ciphersuite offered or selected by one party matches the offer or selection received by the other party. EAP methods providing this kind of integrity check claim to achieve protected ciphersuite negotiation (security claim 1). However, the integrity protected channel between peer and AS can only be established upon the successful completion of the key exchange. Even if peer and AS already share a secret a priori, as in EAP-GPSK, a fresh key needs to be derived for the integrity-protected channel. As a consequence, the original negotiation can never be integrity protected and the integrity of the exchange can only be checked at a later time. Hence, an adversary who launches a downgrading attack as described in Section 3.1 is able to modify all subsequent messages including the ones containing the integrity check as long as the key exchange is breakable on-line.
Some EAP methods intend to provide advanced security features, for example, privacy. In some cases these advanced features enable attacks. For instance, the anonymous key exchange algorithms that can be used to provide privacy, such as the anonymous DH key exchange supported by TLS ciphersuites v1.1 [15] used in EAP-TTLS, suffer from MitM attacks. We showed in the previous section that using anonymous DH key exchange does not provide privacy in presence of an active adversary. Furthermore, we showed that the inner authentication and key exchange algorithms in EAP-TTLS must be cryptographically strong to prevent MitM attacks whenever anonymous DH is used as outer key exchange to establish the tunnel. However, this condition for the inner methods contradicts the original design goal of EAP-TTLS, i.e. to enable the use of legacy EAP methods such as password authentication as inner method. Note that the same attack applies if the anonymous key exchange algorithm is selected as a result of a successful downgrading attack.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDA-TIONS
In this paper, we first present attacks that break some EAP security claims, namely protected ciphersuite negotiation, cryptographic binding and channel binding. The attacks compromise the key exchange, authentication and privacy of EAP methods that claim most, if not all of security properties. Next we discuss the challenges of EAP communication systems that are responsible for the vulnerabilities of EAP methods. These challenges make it difficult to directly adopt existing trust models used by other secure protocols. We dissect the three party communication model and reveal the primary challenges. Through our analysis, it is concluded that EAP security claims cannot provide precise information on the actual security properties of each EAP method. The actual security of an EAP method varies for each of its supported variations. Furthermore, the claims also depend on other protocols and infrastructure support.
We summarize our discussions by giving the following recommendations for a more secure use of EAP methods. When analyzing the security of proposed EAP methods, compromised authenticators must be included in the trust model. When implementing EAP: 1) key exchange algorithms that are breakable in real time must not be supported and all offered EAP methods must provide protected ciphersuite negotiation. 2) Anonymous key exchange algorithms must not be supported in tunnelled EAP methods. 3) Weaker inner methods can only be used in tunnelled EAP methods if the outer authentication is cryptographically strong (at least server to client), the outer key exchange is strong and cryptographic binding including a cryptographically bound integrity key is used to protect the ciphersuite negotiation. 4) A mechanism or infrastructure that allows address and identity mappings to support channel binding needs to be provided. These conditions prevent the attacks described in Sections 3.1-3.4.
